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Abstract
Quantum correlations between two particles show non-classical proper-
ties which can be used for providing secure transmission of information. We
present a quantum cryptographic system, in which users store particles in
quantum memories kept in a transmission center. Correlations between the
particles stored by two users are created upon request by projecting their
product state onto a fully entangled state. Our system allows for secure com-
munication between any pair of users who have particles in the same center.
Unlike other quantum cryptographic systems, it can work without quantum
channels and is suitable for building a quantum cryptographic network. We
also present a modified system with many centers.
Typeset using REVTEX
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I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The main goal of cryptography, the secure transmission of messages, can be achieved
using a secret key known only to the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob. The only known
way which might allow two users to create an unconditionally secret key without sharing
any common information in advance is quantum cryptography [1–6]. In quantum crypto-
graphic schemes Alice uses non-orthogonal quantum states (transmitted through a quantum
channel) to transfer the key to Bob. Such states cannot be cloned hence any attempt by an
eavesdropper, known as Eve, to get information on the key disturbs the transmitted signals
and induces noise. This noise will be detected by Alice and Bob during the second stage
of the transmission, which includes discussion over a public channel. The alternative to
quantum key distribution schemes, Public Key Cryptography [7,8], relies on computational
complexity assumptions such as the difficulty of factoring. To date, none of the existing
public key cryptosystems is proven secure, even against attacker with limited computation
power. Moreover, it was recently shown [9] that these complexity assumptions may not hold
for a quantum computer (for example, a quantum computer should enable fast factoriza-
tion). This implies that many public key cryptosystems, such as RSA [8], may be broken
by quantum computers.
These new developments enhanced the interest in quantum cryptography and started a
wide surge of interest in the field of quantum computing. However, building such computing
devices is a difficult task, and quantum computing (which was invented a decade ago [10])
is only doing its first experimental steps. The building blocks of future quantum computers
are one-bit and two-bit quantum logical gates [11–14], which are currently under intensive
development [15–17]. Building quantum computing devices to factor large numbers does
not seem to be practical in the foreseeable future since it requires combining many one-bit
and two-bit gates. However, a single two-bit gate also have intriguing uses in information
processing and quantum communication such as teleporting a quantum state [18], and dense
coding in quantum cryptography [6]. We shall show in this paper that the use of quantum
gates together with a quantum memory (in which a quantum state can be maintained for
a long time without loss of coherence) opens new directions in quantum cryptography. Our
system may be practical long before quantum computers are, hence provides a short-term
application for quantum gates.
One of the main disadvantages of quantum cryptography is its restriction to relatively
short channels. This is due to the fact that, in contrast to classical channels, a quantum
channel cannot use repeaters to amplify the signal without loss of coherence. Currently,
working prototypes allow transmission to distances of about 10 km [19], and up to 23 km for
a recent experiment using installed telecom fibers [20]. Commercial systems may become
available in the near future [21], so that two users will be able to communicate securely
(if they are not too far). However, building quantum cryptographic networks based on the
existing schemes1 seems to cause severe difficulties (which may even make it impractical):
1For a suggestion of a quantum cryptographic networks based on the existing schemes see [22].
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1. Quantum communication requires any pair of users to have a common quantum chan-
nel, or alternatively a center (or a telephone-like switching network) connected by
quantum channels to all the users, which should match any pair of channels upon
request; enhancing the security of the current world-wide telephone network (which
contains about N ≈ 109 users (telephones) ) using quantum cryptography requires
huge investments in quantum channels and devices.
2. Any user must have the financial and technological abilities to operate complicated
quantum devices.
3. The keys must be transmitted online, or else one would need to transmit O(N2) keys
in advance to enable any pairs of users to communicate in secrecy.
4. The network must assure authenticity of the users.
It is important to have quantum cryptographic networks not suffering from these problems.
In this work we suggest a new cryptographic scheme in which users store quantum states
in quantum memories, kept in a transmission center. Upon request from two users, the
center uses two-bit gates to project the product state of two non correlated particles (one
from each user) onto a fully entangled state. As a result, the two users can share a secret bit,
which is unknown even to the center. Our scheme can operate without quantum channels,
if the quantum states are “programmed” at the center. In that case, the scheme does not
suffer from the four problems just mentioned, and can operate at any distance. Hence, it is
especially appropriate for building a quantum cryptographic network of many users. Such
a system actually shows some of the useful properties of the public key cryptosystems, but
yet, it doesn’t require computation assumptions.
In Section II, we introduce our notation by reviewing various schemes for quantum
cryptography and specifically describe the EPR-scheme. We then present a new two-party
quantum cryptographic scheme which is a time-reversed EPR-scheme. In Section III, we
present a quantum network based on the scheme presented in Section II with the addition
of the quantum memories. In Section IV, we discuss the possibilities of implementing our
scheme in practice. In Section V, we present a more advanced network, based on quantum
teleportation, where users can store their states in different centers and the centers teleport
states upon request. This network uses quantum channels. However, it requires quantum
channels only between the centers, so that the problems stated above do not arise. In
Section VI we summarize our results.
II. A TIME-REVERSED EPR-SCHEME FOR QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Quantum cryptography provides techniques to distribute keys between two users, and
its safety depends only on the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics. The legitimate
users cannot prevent Eve from listening to their information exchange, but they will know
if she does (hence, in this case, will not use this non-secret information). The first quantum
cryptographic scheme, the Bennett Brassard (BB84) scheme [1], was presented already a
decade ago. We describe it using the terminology of spin 1/2 particles, but it can use
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any two-dimensional Hilbert space. A classical two-level system, such as a bistable device,
can only be found in one of the two possible states, hence encodes one bit. In contrast,
a quantum system can be prepared in any coherent superposition of the two basis states,
which creates a much richer structure. Such a system is now known as a “qubit” [23] (i.e.
quantum bit). For each qubit, Alice chooses at random whether to prepare her state along
the z or the x axis, i.e., in one of the two eigenstates of either Sˆz or Sˆx. This state, denoted
by: | ↑〉, | ↓〉, | ←〉 or | →〉 is then sent to Bob. It is agreed that the two states | ↑〉 and
| ←〉 stand for bit value ‘0’, and the other two states, | ↓〉 and | →〉 stand for ‘1’. Bob
chooses, also at random, whether to measure Sˆz or Sˆx. When his measurement is along
the same axis as Alice’s preparation (e.g. they both use Sˆz), the measured value should be
the same as hers, whereas when they use conjugate axes, there is no correlation between
his result and Alice’s original choice. In addition to the quantum channel, the legitimate
users also use a classical channel which may be monitored, but cannot be modified by an
eavesdropper (this assumption is discussed in [5], and is not required if Alice and Bob have
a way to authenticate each other over the classical channel). By discussing over this channel
Alice and Bob agree to discard all the instances where they did not use the same axes. The
result should be two strings of perfectly correlated bits. As the choice of axis used by Alice
is unknown to Eve, any interaction by her will unavoidably modify the transmission and
introduce some errors. In practice however, the transmission will never be perfect and there
will be some errors, even in the absence of an eavesdropper. Alice and Bob use the classical
channel to compare some portion of their data and calculate the error rate. If it is not too
high they can use classical information processing techniques, such as error correction and
privacy amplification [5,24], to reduce the error rate to zero, while reducing the information
obtained by Eve to zero as well. All these operations waste many bits (henceforth, l), so
in order to be left with a key of L bits Alice should send L′ > 2(L + l) qubits. A formal
proof of security against an eavesdropper who is assumed to be limited only by the rules
of quantum mechanics is still missing but may be available soon. These security aspects
are widely discussed in the literature in case of the BB84 scheme but are common to all
quantum cryptographic schemes and will not be discussed here.
More recently, another quantum key distribution scheme, based on EPR [25] correlations,
was suggested by Ekert [2] and modified by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [3]. We describe
here the modified version which we call the EPR scheme. In this scheme Alice creates pairs
of spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state, and sends one particle from each pair to Bob. When
the two particles are measured separately the results obtained for them are correlated. For
example, if they are measured along the same axis, the results are opposite, regardless of
the axis. Alice and Bob use the same sets of axes, say Sˆz and Sˆx, and keep the results only
when they used the same axis. It is noteworthy that, in the EPR scheme, the pairs could
be created by any other party, including Eve herself.
As this point will prove crucial in our new scheme, let us discuss it in more details. The
singlet state may be written in two ways:
Ψ(−) =
√
1
2
(|↑A↓B〉 − |↓A↑B〉)
=
√
1
2
(|←A→B〉 − |→A←B〉) , (1)
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where the equality follows from |→〉 = 1
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉) and |←〉 = 1
2
(|↑〉− |↓〉) , and where the
subscripts ‘A’ and ‘B’, which stand for Alice and for Bob, can be omitted since we always
write Alice’s particle first. When Alice and Bob use the same axis, either z or x, we use
the first or the second equation respectively, to see that their measurements always yield
opposite results. The singlet state is the only state which has that property. Therefore, as
Alice and Bob may measure either of these two options, any deviation from the protocol by
Eve (i.e. any attempt to create another state), will be detected with non zero probability. So
Eve must create the required singlet state, from which she cannot extract any information
about Alice’s and Bob’s measurement (see [2,3] for more details).
The first aim of our paper is to suggest another scheme for quantum cryptography, which
we shall call the time-reversed EPR-scheme. Let both Alice and Bob send one of the four
states of BB84, | ↑〉, | ↓〉, |←〉 or |→〉 to a third person whom we refer to as the center (the
purpose of using this name shall be clarified in Section III). The center measures their qubits
together to find whether or not the two particles are in a singlet state. This can be done by
measuring the total-spin operator (Sˆtotal)
2. If the result of the measurement is s = 0, then
the two particles are projected onto the singlet state. In that case Eq. 1 ensures that, if
the two spins were prepared along the same axis, then they necessarily had opposite values
(the projection of the states with identical spins on the singlet state is zero). As result, Bob
knows Alice’s bit and vice versa. However, from Eq. 1, a honest center, who followed the
protocol and projected onto the singlet state, has absolutely no knowledge on these bits. For
example, when Alice and Bob both used the vertical axis, the center does not know whether
Alice had the up state and Bob the down state, or vice versa. If the measurement result is
s = 1, Alice and Bob cannot infer anything about the value of each other’s bit, and shall
discard the transmission. The probability of obtaining the singlet state is zero when Alice
and Bob sent the same state (e.g., ↑↑), and is half in case they sent opposite states. Taking
into account the case where Alice and Bob use different axes (which will also be discarded),
we find that the overall probability to obtain a usable state is only one eighth.
To create a key with many bits, Alice and Bob send strings of quantum states (L′ >
8(L + l) qubits) to the center. The center must be able to keep them for a while (in case
the states do not arrive at the same time from Alice and Bob), and then to measure the
first pair, the second pair etc. The center tells Alice and Bob all cases in which the result of
the measurement is a singlet, which happens in one fourth of the cases. Alice and Bob then
compare their axes. When they used the same axis (which happens about half of the time),
they know that their spins are necessarily opposite, and thus Bob can calculate Alice’s bits
to share a key with her. As in the BB84 scheme and the EPR schemes Alice and Bob use
the classical discussion channel to estimate the error-rate. If it is tolerable they perform
error correction and privacy amplification, to derive a final L-bit key.
The security of our protocol derives from the security of the EPR protocol, and relies
on the fact that the singlet state is the only state for which the two spins are anticorrelated
both in the Sˆz and in the Sˆx basis. However, as explained previously, if the center projects
on the singlet state, he does not get any information on Alice’s and Bob’s bits. Therefore,
a cheating center needs to project onto a different state (possibly entangled with his own
system), which cannot give perfect anticorrelations along both Sˆz and Sˆx axes. Since the
center cannot know in advance which basis was used by Alice and by Bob (the two density
matrices corresponding to using Sˆz or Sˆx are identical), he will unavoidably introduce errors,
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which Alice and Bob shall identify during the discussion.
In fact, in terms of eavesdropping possibilities, our protocol and the EPR protocol are
equivalent, as we show using the scheme presented in Fig. 1. In this scheme, two EPR pairs
are created, one particle of each pair is sent to the center, and the second one to Alice and
to Bob. In Fig. 1a, the center performs a measurement on his two particles first. A honest
center, who follows the agreed protocol, projects the particles onto the singlet state. The
two particles sent to Alice and to Bob are now in the singlet state as well. This is therefore
equivalent to the EPR scheme. The only difference is that the projection onto the singlet
state performed by the center succeeds with probability 1/4 only. This means that the
center will ask to discard 3/4 of the transmission, but this does not affect the eavesdropping
issue. A cheating center can send to Alice and Bob any state he wants, including any desired
entanglement with his own system, by choosing an appropriate unitary transformation and
the correct state on which to project his own particles. To show that, we start with the two
singlet pairs and let the center introduce an ancilla in a state Ainit. The state of the whole
system is:
ΦABC =
1
2
(
|↑↓〉 − |↓↑〉)⊗ (|↑↓〉 − |↓↑〉
)
⊗Ainit . (2)
The first particle of each singlet pair is sent to Alice and to Bob respectively, while the
center keeps the second, together with his ancilla. The state ΦABC can thus be rearranged
as:
ΦABC =
1
2
(
|↑↑〉AB ⊗ |↓↓〉C + |↓↓〉AB ⊗ |↑↑〉C − |↑↓〉AB ⊗ |↓↑〉C − |↓↑〉AB ⊗ |↑↓〉C
)
⊗ Ainit ,
(3)
where the index AB refers to the particles sent to Alice and Bob, and the index C refers
to the particles kept by the center. The center now applies a unitary transformation U to
entangle his particles with the ancilla in the following way:
UΦABC =
1
2
(
|↑↑〉AB ⊗ |↓↓〉C ⊗ A1 + |↓↓〉AB ⊗ |↑↑〉C ⊗ A2
−|↑↓〉AB ⊗ |↓↑〉C ⊗A3 − |↓↑〉AB ⊗ |↑↓〉C ⊗ A4
)
, (4)
with Ai any normalized states of the ancilla which are (in general) not orthogonal to one
another. By projecting his state onto ψ = α| ↓↓〉C + β| ↑↑〉C − γ| ↓↑〉C − δ| ↑↓〉C (this
projection succeeds with probability 1/4 on average), the center creates the state
ΨABC =
1
2
(
α∗|↑↑〉AB ⊗ A1 + β
∗|↓↓〉AB ⊗ A2 + γ
∗|↑↓〉AB ⊗A3 + δ
∗|↓↑〉AB ⊗ A4
)
, (5)
which is the most general state the center could create when cheating the EPR scheme [3].
This demonstrate the equivalence between Fig. 1a and the EPR scheme.
In Fig. 1b, the first measurement is performed by Alice and Bob, who project the par-
ticles onto the BB84 states. Therefore, the particles arriving at the center are also in the
BB84 states, and this scheme is identical to ours. Since the relative time of the measure-
ments cannot influence the outcome, all these schemes are equivalent. Following the same
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reasoning, but in two steps (first letting only Alice measure before the center) it is also
possible to show that the security of the BB84 scheme implies the security of our scheme.
Since the security of the EPR scheme implies the security of the BB84 scheme [3], our proof
actually shows that the security of the three schemes is equivalent.
Using only the total spin measurement, less than one eighth of the qubits could be used.
A better choice, although possibly more difficult to implement in practice, is to measure the
Bell operator (defined in [26]) whose eigenstates (the Bell states) are the singlet state, Ψ(−)
(equation 1), and the three other states:
Φ(+) =
√
1
2
(|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉) =
√
1
2
(|←←〉+ |→→〉) , (6)
Ψ(+) =
√
1
2
(|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉) = −
√
1
2
(|←←〉 − |→→〉) (7)
and
Φ(−) =
√
1
2
(|↑↑〉− ↓↓〉) =
√
1
2
(|←→〉+ |→←〉) , (8)
where the second expression for each of the Bell states is derived by expanding them (as was
done for the singlet state) into the (|←〉 , |→〉) basis. Consider a case where Alice and Bob
used the same basis. According to the result of the measurement, and to the choice of axes
by Alice and Bob, their prepared states are known to be either correlated (e.g. if the result
is Φ(−) and they both used the z axis), or anticorrelated (e.g. if the result is still Φ(−) but
they both used the x axis).
The protocol goes as follows:
• The center retrieves the particles from Alice and Bob and measures the Bell operator
on each pair. He gets one of the four above states, and tells his result to Alice and
Bob.
• Alice and Bob tell each other the axis they used (but not the bit value). When they
used different axes, they discard the transmission. Whenever they used the same axis,
they know if their bits are correlated or anticorrelated. In this case half of the quantum
states are used to derive the desired key, and L′ > 2(L+ l) qubits are required.
The proof of security for this case is similar to the proof in the singlet case. A honest
center, who projects the states onto the allowed states, cannot get any information on the
bits. For example, if the center obtains the state Φ(+), and Alice and Bob announce later
that they used the horizontal axis, the center only knows that either both Alice and Bob
have the left state, or both have the right state. But he cannot know which of these two
possibilities occurred, hence has no information on the bit values. Moreover, similarly to the
singlet case, Φ(+) is the only state for which Alice’s and Bob’s states have such correlations
along both x and z axes. Therefore, a cheating center, who needs to create a different state
in order to gain information, shall be detected with finite probability.
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III. A QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC NETWORK
In this Section we combine the reversed EPR scheme and the use of quantum memories
into a classical network to present a quantum cryptographic network. The classical protocol
for a network uses a “hidden file” managed by a communication center. Any user is allowed
to put data (secret keys) in the file, under his name, but only the center has access to the
data. Let there be N users, and let each of them store many L-bits strings. Upon request
from two users, the center uses their data and creates a secret key for them, which is shared
by both of them: the center calculates the XOR of one string of the first user (say, a1 . . . aL
of Alice), and one string of the second user (say, b1 . . . bL of Bob); the XOR of a string is
calculated bit by bit using cj = aj ⊕ bj (the parity of the two bits), and the resultant string,
C = c1 . . . cL, is transmitted (via a classical unprotected channel) to Alice; Alice rederives
Bob’s string by calculating the XOR of her string with the received string, and can use Bob’s
string as their common key. Secure transmissions from each user to the center can be done
either by personal delivery, trusted couriers or quantum key distribution. Such a classical
key distribution scheme is perfectly secure if we assume that the center holding them is
perfectly safe and trusted. No other person (except the center) can have any information
on their key. Even a powerful eavesdropper who can impersonate the center and all the
users cannot eavesdrop, since the center and each of the legitimate users can use some of
the secret bits for authenticating each other. Alice and Bob need to trust the center for two
different purposes:
1. To “forget” their secret key (and not trying to listen to the messages transmitted using
that key);
2. To authenticate one to the other in case they have no other way of authentication. This
is a new possibility of authentication, added to the two options, previously mentioned
in Section II. Thus the assumption of having classical channels which cannot be mod-
ified can be completely removed, even if the users have no other way to authenticate
each other.
The main reason why this simple scheme is not satisfactory in practice, is that it concentrates
too much power in the distribution center. Indeed the center can understand all the secret
communications going through its distribution web, or connect Alice to an adversary instead
of to Bob. Even if we assume that the center is trusted, any eavesdropper who manages to
get access to it could decipher all the communications.
Using a quantum memory instead of a classical memory is the key-point in deriving
the quantum network, hence we present it in more details. While a classical bit can only
represent a zero or a one, a qubit |φ〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉 is described by two complex numbers (up
to freedom of overall phase and normalization requirement). Unlike a classical memory which
keeps n classical independent bits, the n qubits in a quantum memory can have non-classical
correlations, and the state of a quantum register is described by 2n complex numbers (up
to freedom of overall phase and normalization requirement). Even the simplest form of a
memory (where the qubits are never correlated) is very important in quantum cryptography.
For example, it allows doubling the efficiency of the BB84 scheme to use only L′ > L + l
qubits: instead of measuring the state sent by Alice immediately, Bob keeps it in a quantum
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memory; waits for Alice to disclose her basis; and then measures the state in the correct
basis. In this case, the BB84 scheme can be used directly to transmit messages instead of
random keys; Alice decide in advance which qubits will be used for error estimation, and
encode the message using the rest of the qubits and using block-coding techniques to allow
for error-correction. A quantum memory is also a basic tool for eavesdropping attacks, as
it allows Eve to couple the transmitted states to an ancilla, and delay the measurement on
the ancilla till the public exchange of basis.
We now present a quantum key distribution network which uses a quantum file instead
of the classical hidden file, and removes the requirement of a trusted center. Alternatively,
we can release the usual assumption of quantum cryptography [5] – that classical channels
cannot be modified by Eve – if we are willing to trust the center for authentication (without
trusting him for ”forgetting” their qubits). Instead of storing L classical bits to make a
future key, each user shall store L′ quantum states (qubits) in specially devised quantum
memories kept in a center. Upon request from two users, the center performs the time
reversed EPR scheme described in the previous Section and creates correlations between
the bits. The resulting string C, which holds the correlation data is sent to Alice via a
classical channel. As in the classical case, using string C, Alice can calculate Bob’s string
to derive a final common key of L bits. If Alice and Bob compare bases after deriving the
data from the center, then, as explained in Section II, any attempt by the center to obtain
the value of these bits will create errors and be discovered by Alice and Bob. The center
therefore does not need to be trusted anymore. Unlike other quantum schemes, the actual
(online) distribution of the secret keys is performed on classical channels. First, the center
let Alice and Bob know the state he got. Then, Alice and Bob continue as in the other two
schemes previously described to obtain the final key. All the quantum communication is
done in advance, when the users “deposit” their quantum strings in the center (preferably
in a personal meeting).
When L-bit strings are stored in a classical hidden file, two users derive L-bit strings
of correlated bits. Using quantum states for representing the bits, longer strings of length
L′ > L+ l are required, since some bits will be used for error estimation, error correction and
privacy amplification. The exact ratio depends on the expected error-rate in the channel.
Only the bits which are encoded in the same basis by both users can be used, therefore
L′ > 2(L + l) bits are actually required (we assume that the more efficient scheme of
measuring the Bell basis is used).
Let us summarize the protocol as follows:
• In the preparation step the user sends (gives) L′-bit strings to the center, each bit is
represented by one of the four states of the BB84 protocol. The center keeps these
quantum states in a quantum file without measuring them. It is important that the
system used for keeping the quantum states will preserve them for a long time (as long
as required until the actual key distribution is performed).
• When Alice and Bob wish to obtain a common secret key, they ask the center to create
correlations between two strings, one of Alice and one of Bob. The center performs
the Bell operator measurement on each pair of photons, which projects them onto one
of the Bell states, and tells Alice and Bob the result he obtained. After Alice gets
the results from the center (and not before that), Alice and Bob compare the basis
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they used and keep only the bits for which they used the same basis. In this case, and
according to the state obtained, the states of Alice and Bob are either correlated or
anticorrelated. So, Alice for example inverts all her bits which should be anticorrelated
with Bob’s. The remaining string should be identical with Bob’s, apart from possible
errors.
• A honest center, who performed the correct projections on the Bell states does not get
any information on the string.
• A cheating center (or any other eavesdropper who might have had access to the quan-
tum files), who modified the allowed states, unavoidably introduced errors between
the two strings.
• Alice and Bob perform error estimation, error correction and privacy amplification to
derive a final key.
The quantum channel is used only as a preparation step between each user and the
center, and all the online communication is done via a classical channel. Yet, only O(N)
keys are required to enable secret communication between any pair of the N users. Any
other quantum key distribution scheme requires O(N2) keys, or else requires online quantum
communication. In fact, our scheme does not require quantum channels at all. As in old
implementations of quantum cryptography [27], the four quantum states can be chosen in
any 2-dimensional Hilbert space. Instead of sending them, each user could arrive once in a
while to the center, and “program” his states into the quantum file. If the memory can keep
the states unperturbed long enough then each user can put as many strings as he needs till
his next visit to the center. By using personal delivery of the quantum states we replace the
distance limitation of all other schemes by a time limit, and solve the problems of a quantum
cryptographic network which were described in the introduction. All the technically involved
steps, such as storing qubits and performing Bell measurements occur only at the center.
IV. IMPLEMENTATIONS
Our scheme requires the possibility to program, store and manipulate quantum bits
rather than to transmit them. Therefore any 2-dimensional Hilbert space system can be
considered and this opens a variety of possible implementations. Fortunately, almost the
same requirements appeared recently in quantum computing, and are being thoroughly
investigated by both theorists [11–14], and experimentalists [15–17]. The main difference
in the requirements is that the quantum bits in our scheme are subjected only once to a
unitary operation of calculation hence the problem of decoherence is much less severe.
We estimate2 that it may be possible to implement a working prototype of our scheme
within a few years, with small modifications of existing technology. Such a prototype shall
be able to keep quantum states for a few minutes and to allow to perform two-bit operations
2The following suggestions were investigated with the help of D. DiVincenzo [28].
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on them. At the moment, the best candidates for combining these two operations are ion
traps. In ion traps the quantum bits can be kept in internal degrees of freedom (say, spin)
of the ions, and in phononic degrees of freedom of few ions together. It is already possible to
keep quantum states in the spin of the ions for more than 10 minutes [29] and in principle it
is possible to keep them for years. These ion traps are also the among the best candidates for
two-bit operations since there are ways to use the phononic degrees of freedom to perform
two-bit operations [14]. Barenco et al. [13] realized that a single quantum controlled-NOT
logical gate would be sufficient to perform the Bell measurement. Using ion traps it is
possible to (partially) perform the Bell measurement as shown both in theory [14] and in an
experiment [17]. Combining together the two experiments to have both long lived quantum
states and the possibility to manipulate them will allow two users to derive a few secure
common bits.
The way to establish a real working scheme with a center and with many users is still
long. The main obstacle is that it is currently impossible to transfer a quantum state from
one ion trap to another. A real network should allow each user to program his quantum
states in a register (say, at least one separated ion trap for each user). Then, upon request
of two users, the center should be able to move one bit of each of the two users to another
ion trap where he can perform the Bell measurement without disturbing the other quantum
states. Recently, the possibility of doing this arose from the idea of combining ion-traps
(where the ions are well controlled) and QED-cavity together, and to use the same internal
degrees of freedom for both [28,30]. We shall call this combination cavitrap for convenience.
In QED cavity [15] the internal degrees of freedom are coupled to photons and not to
phonons. Recently, another group [16] has shown that it is possible to use polarization
states of photons instead of using the |0〉 and |1〉 Fock state. If such photon states are used
in a cavitrap, it may be possible to use them to transmit a quantum state from one cavitrap
to another [28]. In some sense, this will be an implementation of the nuclear spins based
“quantum gearbox” suggested by DiVincenzo [12].
All this discussion would be nothing but a fantasy if our scheme would yield the only
application of these ideas. However, as we already said, similar (and more complicated) ideas
are required for other usages of quantum gates in both quantum computing and quantum
information, and a lot of effort is invested in both the theory and application of quantum
gates. Quantum memory is less discussed in quantum computing, but more in quantum
cryptography, and the use of quantum memory to attack quantum cryptographic schemes is
already appreciated. Nevertheless, the use of a quantum memory by the legitimate users of a
quantum cryptographic scheme is not common, due to the desire to present protocols which
may be implemented with existing technology. However, bypassing this “habit” and using a
forthcoming tool is certainly justified when it allows to carry out new and important tasks
which cannot be performed without it. The use of quantum memory in our network is clearly
such a case, and we are sure that it will allow many other new tasks in the future. While
we were working on this paper, it was suggested to use both quantum gates and quantum
memory for purification of singlets [31], an idea which is useful for quantum cryptography
as well.
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V. WORLD-WIDE NETWORK OF MANY CENTERS
The network of Section III is well suited for communication among users who are not
far away and can arrive to the center. For two users who are far away and cannot come to
the same center our network may not be appropriate. We now show that it can be modified
to be useful also in this case. Let there be many centers, and many users in each center.
Each two centers should share many EPR singlet pairs and upon request of users of the
two centers, one center would teleport [18] the qubits of his user to the other center. This
operation can be done with 100% efficiency (but it may, however, increase the error-rate).
The singlet pairs can be transmitted using any quantum cryptography scheme or even using
a teleportation scheme and a supercenter who share EPR pairs with all centers. However,
the transmission and distribution of singlet pairs require quantum channels even if done in
advance3.
Do we lose all the benefits we gained before? Certainly not. Still, only the centers
need to have ability of performing quantum operations. All quantum transmission is done
in advance, and yet, there is no need for O(N2) strings, since the number of centers is
much smaller than the number of users. Authentication is still simple. One problem of any
quantum channel is the limit on its length. Our first scheme (with one center) replaced it
by a limit on time. It would be bad to have both problems in a network of many centers.
However, the suggestion of purifying singlets [31] enables transmitting signals to longer
distances. Our scheme can make an excellent use of it, since only the centers need to have
the technological ability of purifying singlets. Moreover, several transmission stations can
be put in between to improve transmission (this idea was suggested by DiVincenzo [28])
by performing purification of singlets between any two neighboring stations and then use
teleportation from one station to the next to derive purified singlets shared by the centers.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we introduced a new scheme for quantum cryptography based on a time-
reversed EPR scheme. We suggested two new types of networks: a classical one based on
hidden files, and one based on quantum files. The security of key distribution protocols
in these networks does not rely on computational complexity assumptions. Both networks
can be used to distribute keys in a secure way among any two users using simple online
communication via classical channel. In the case of hidden files it is done with the help of a
trusted center who can have access to all the information exchanged through its lines. Using
quantum files, the center need not be trusted. Users have the means to check whether the
center, or any other eavesdropper, tried to obtain information on the transmitted messages.
The one-center quantum network we suggest does not require any quantum channel at all,
and can be implemented in a center where each user “programs” his states into a quantum
3And transporting quantum states to deliver them by a personal meeting is similar to transmitting
them through channels
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memory. We estimate that a working prototype may be built in the near future using ion-
traps technology. A real network can be built when the problem of transmitting a quantum
state from one trap to another is be solved (perhaps using cavitrap with polarization states).
The machinery required for our scheme is also required for much more complicated tasks
such as purification and quantum computing. In this respect, our scheme may represent
a first practical application for these new devices, which are now being planned in various
laboratories. We hope that our work will motivate more research for systems which can
both keep a quantum state for a long time, and allow for the desired programming and
measurements. We didn’t pay much attention to the delicate problem of programming the
states. The programming requires a simple equipment to make sure that the center does
not eavesdrop on the preparation step. While cavitraps are very complicated, programming
the polarization state of each of the photons may be quite simple in the future.
A future system of secure communication based on the protocol of Section V would
involve a number of large transmission centers, which can exchange EPR correlated particles
and store them, together with the qubits deposited at the center by various users. Secure
communication between any pair of users would then imply teleportation of the states to
the same center, followed by the creation of correlations between the two strings.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Two processes, which we use to prove the security of the protocol. In both figures, one
particle of each EPR correlated pair (denoted by dashed lines) is sent to the center, who performs
a Bell measurement. We consider only the case where the result of the measurement is a singlet
state. The second particles are sent to Alice and to Bob respectively, who project them onto the
BB84 states. In a), the first measurement is done by the center. The particles arriving to Alice and
Bob are therefore in the singlet state like in the EPR based protocol. In b), the first measurement
is performed by Alice and Bob. Each particle sent to the center is therefore in one of the BB84
states. This is similar to our protocol.
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